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NOTE

THE SLIPPERY DEFINITION OF
'MARITAL STATUS' AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS' FREE REIGN TO
DISCRIMINATE
A CASENOTE ON
PARKER-BIGBACK

v. ST. LABRE SCHOOL

Edward T. LeClaire*

I. INTRODUCTION

In August of 2000, an election year, the Montana Supreme
Court decided the case of Parker-Bigback v. St. Labre School.'
Vera Parker-Bigback, a former employee of a Catholic school,
alleged discriminatory termination because her supervisor and
priest, Father Emmet Hoffman, disapproved of her living with a
man to whom she was not married. 2 The Montana Constitution
provides for freedom of religion in Article II § 5, while § 4
*
University of Montana School of Law, class of 2003.
Thanks to Beth
Brenneman, staff attorney of the ACLU of Montana. Thanks also to my colleagues on
the Montana Law Review.
1. Parker-Bigback v. St. Labre School, 2000 MT 210, 7 P.3d 361, 301 Mont. 16.
2. Id. IT 1& 3.
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from
institution
any
prohibiting
language
includes
discriminating. The stage had been set for a Montana Supreme
Court decision weighing competing Constitutional rights.
Parker-Bigback based her claim on MCA § 49-2-303, 3 which
makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate based on
marital status. 4 The District Court granted summary judgment
for St. Labre, reasoning that "Bigback's claim would interfere
with the 'free exercise' clause of the First Amendment to the
5
United States Constitution."
The Montana Constitution and statutory scheme dealing
with discrimination differ markedly from the federal
At the federal level,
constitution and statutory scheme.
discrimination is governed by Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.6
Section 702 has been read to exempt religious organizations
from the rest of the anti-discrimination scheme, in effect giving
religious organizations a free ticket to commit the less egregious
forms of discrimination. Freedom of religion is guaranteed in
the First Amendment. 7 However, legal protection from
discrimination is statutory and the scheme itself contemplates
exceptions for religious institutions. 8 Although some argue for
interpreting this scheme as allowing all discrimination by
religious organizations, where there was other than religious
discrimination, "courts have generally held that the exemption
in § 702, as amended, was not applicable." 9 Further, federal
courts realize the inherent tension between discrimination and
freedom of religion: while religious institutions must be able to
engage in certain actions, an outer limit of allowable religious
discrimination also exists.
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (2002) provides: (1) it is unlawful discriminatory
practice for: (a) an employer to refuse employment to a person, to bar a person from
employment, or to discriminate against a person in compensation or in a term, condition,
or privilege of employment because of race, creed, religion, color, or national origin or
because of age, physical or mental disability, marital status, or sex when the reasonable
demands of the position do not require an age, physical or mental disability, marital
status, or sex distinction;
4. Parker-Bigback, I 4.
5. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1(a) (2002).
7. U.S.CONST. amend. I.
8. See § 702 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-1); and Annotation,
Validity, Construction,and Application of Provisions of § 702 of Civil Rights Act of 1964
Exempting Activities of Religious Organizations from Operation of Title VII Equal
Employment Opportunity Provisions, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 874 (1984).
9. 67 A.L.R. Fed. 874, § 2 (1984).
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At the state level, the Montana Constitution specifically
provides for both freedom from discrimination as well as
freedom of religion. 10 The Montana statute's exception differs
markedly from the federal statute. It allows employers to
discriminate only when the reasonable demands of the position
require the discrimination." The Montana Constitution also
specifically precludes discrimination, 1 2 although the Montana
Supreme Court has not yet interpreted this clause. But the
Montana Supreme Court has overturned other statutes, based
on sections such as the Montana Constitution's guarantee of
privacy.13 Thus, the Court would also be likely to construe
section four (individual dignity) with a similar weight to section
ten (right of privacy).
In considering Parker-Bigback, the
Montana Supreme Court had an opportunity to weigh and
address these competing fundamental rights: freedom of
religion, freedom from discrimination, and privacy rights.
But the decision sidestepped these issues.
The Court
determined the "case is not about marital status or gender. It is
about conduct which Bigback agreed to avoid when she signed
her employment agreement with St. Labre School."' 4 The court
went through no analysis of the terms of employment, whose
competing terms raised doubts as to whether Parker-Bigback
had so agreed. The court did not further define or interpret
"marital status." What Montanans are left with is a confusing
case with disturbing implications.
The Montana statute's
exception is not limited to religious organizations, but rather
makes an exception when the reasonable demands of the
10. See MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 5. Note that the Montana Constitution
specifically refers to forms of discrimination in public education. MONT. CONST. art. X §
7. But this doesn't apply to St. Labre, as it is a sectarian school, receiving no public
monies in accord with art. X § 6, "St. Labre participates in the Montana School Lunch
Program but receives no other outside funding except for an occasional grant." Available
at: http://www.billingscatholicschools.orglpage56.html.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303. One might assume this is narrower than the
federal statute, and it very well may be when applied to religious institutions. However,
note that this language is not limited to religious institutions.
12. "The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political
rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or
religious ideas." MONT. CONST. art. II § 4.
13. See Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 989 P.2d 364, 296 Mont. 361 (1999);
Gryzcan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 283 Mont. 433 (1997). "The right of the individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without
the showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art II § 10 (1972).
14. Parker-Bigback, 17.
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position require the discrimination. Are we to conclude that any
time parties so determine, they might reasonably contract
around the state discrimination statute? Finally, who bears the
burden of proof as to when the reasonable demands of the
position require the discrimination?
This casenote seeks to explain the various faults of the
decision. First, the federal statutory scheme with respect to
freedom of religion will be explained as well as Montana's
scheme and interpretations. Second, the definition of marital
status will be addressed through analysis of legislative history
and Montana case law. Lastly, the case itself will be analyzed.
Concluding with an analysis of how the court otherwise might
have applied the precedents and speculate as to the future of
discrimination in regard to religion in Montana.
II. ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY SCHEMES
A. Federal
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes illegal certain types of
discrimination, yet -creates an exemption for religious
organizations. 1 5
As enacted, the exception for religious
organizations applied only to those organizations' religious
activities. Congress amended section 702 in 1972, deleting the
words requiring the exception to apply to religious activities. 16
Thus, cases interpreting this statute hinge on whether or not the
acts alleged as discrimination were within the realm of the
organization's religious activities. The federal courts recognize
the narrow line which must be tread in dealing with
discrimination issues in regard to religious organizations. 17 On
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), "It shall be an unlawful employment practice of an
employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."; Id. § 2000e-1(a), "This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."
16. See, 67 A.L.R. FED. 874 § lc (1984 & Supp. 2001).
17. The first part of the First Amendment is, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. There has been criticism of the high school civics interpretation of this
section: that the framers intended an impenetrable wall between church and state. See,
e.g., Judge Noonan, President's Lecture Series at The University of Montana, (Oct. 22,
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the one hand, organizations must be free from certain claims of
employment discrimination, otherwise the government would be
Yet, the
interfering with the free exercise of religion.
government must be careful in the immunities afforded religious
institutions, so as not to effectively endorse religion by making
its institutions above the law.
Perhaps the most illustrative case since the 1972
amendment is Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.18 Amos addressed
whether it was a violation of the establishment clause for a
religious organization to be immune when terminating
employees who failed to qualify as members of that
organization. 19 The Supreme Court held that the exception to
The
Title VII did not violate the establishment clause. 20
plaintiff had worked for the Deseret Gymnasium for sixteen
years but was terminated in 1981 for failure to qualify for a
21
temple recommend.
Of primary importance to Amos was how to apply the three
part Lemon test,2 2 which is used to evaluate whether statutes
violate the establishment clause. Lemon requires that the law
in question can demonstrate a secular purpose; the law has a
principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and it does not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion. 23 Before going into the parts of the
test, the court noted that "there is ample room under the
Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference.' 24 Under the first part of Lemon, the
court found that Congress' motivation to modify the statute to
exclude all of a religious organization's activities could be
2001) (there is no 'wall' between church and state; rather the state may not establish
religion, nor may it interfere with the free exercise thereof, yet religious organizations
are not precluded from participating in government). Yet, either interpretation should
still recognize the narrow zone in which the courts must operate.
18. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
19. See id.
20. Id. at 339.
21. Id. at 331 n.4 ("Temple recommends are issued only to individuals who observe
the Church's standards in such matters as regular church attendance, tithing, and
abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco").
22. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23. Id. at 612-613. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (explaining the
Lemon test only applies to laws affording universal benefit to all religions).
24. PresidingBishop, 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970)).
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secularly construed. The Court speculated that Congress may
have desired to avoid a situation where judges were making
decisions on which activities of a religious organization were
religious and which were not.
Applying the second part of Lemon, to neither advance nor
inhibit religion, the Court found that although the law allows for
greater advancement of religion, it is not because the
government itself is advancing religion through activities and
influence. 25 Rather, finishing the Lemon analysis, the Court
found that the statute effectuates a more complete separation of
church and state, avoiding the impermissible entanglement
endorsing or promoting religion. Therefore, passing Lemon, the
court applied rationality review and found the statute's
26
exception for religious institutions to be acceptable.
Courts realize there may be an overlap between religious
tenets falling under the section 702 exclusion and certain classes
otherwise protected from discrimination. In Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh Day Adventists,27 a woman who was
qualified for a pastoral position claimed sexual and racial
discrimination when she was not hired. 28 The appeals court first
addressed how to constitutionally interpret the statute. It found
Title VII "exempts religious institutions only to a narrow
extent."2 9 "While the language of § 702 makes clear that
religious institutions may base relevant hiring decisions upon
religious preferences, Title VII does not confer upon religious
organizations a license to make those same decisions on the
basis of race, sex, or national origin."3° Thus, the court found
that the statute clearly applied to the case, preventing religious
organizations from discriminating on those grounds. However,
because of the serious implications of governmental interference
with a church to freely choose its leaders, the court next applied
the Yoder 3 ' balancing test, which is used to determine whether a
state interest is of a sufficient magnitude to override the
interests protected in the establishment clause. Yoder balances
the burden on the free exercise against the impediments to the
state's objectives that would flow from the recognized
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 337.
Id. at 339.
772 F.2d 1164 (Ct.App. 4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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exception. 32 Applying this standard, the court found that "state
process would excessively
intervention in the appointment
33
inhibit religious liberty."
Courts have recognized a right for religious institutions to
enforce certain moral precepts in their employment decisions,
even though such actions would otherwise be discriminatory. In
Dolter, a teacher at a Catholic school had been fired because she
was single and pregnant. 34 The District Court had to determine
whether a summary judgment was appropriate. The defense
alleged that it was entitled to set standards of morality and
plaintiff was terminated for a breach of those standards. In
discussing section 2000e-1, the court said,
It does not exempt religious educational institutions with respect
It merely indicates that such
to any and all discrimination.
institutions may choose to employ exclusively members of their
own religion to teach in their schools without fear of being charged
with Religious discrimination. Thus, in the context of this case
only Catholics and not be
Wahlert high School could choose to hire
35
held liable for religious discrimination.

The defense also raised an excessive entanglement
argument, 36 claiming no jurisdiction over religious organizations
under Title VII because it would require courts to pass judgment
on the legitimacy of moral teachings and religious precepts. But
the court determined it did not need to determine the legitimacy
of the school's moral requirements, it only needed to determine
whether Dolter was discharged because she was pregnant. The
court took note that the school could indeed terminate teachers
for engaging in pre-marital sexual intercourse, but only so long
37
as the policy was applied equally to males and females.
Therefore, the court denied the defense's motion for summary
As to the bona fide occupational qualification
judgment.
exception to the statute, the court did not question the religious
school's right to have such a qualification. But when the teacher
asserted she knew other single teachers who had violated the
code and were not discharged, this raised a sufficient question to
go to trial as to whether the claimed moral code was merely a
38
pretext for the discrimination.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 214.
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168.
Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F.Supp. 266, 267-268 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 271.
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While the religious exception has been construed broadly to
avoid an excessive entanglements argument, courts have
recognized an outer limit to this exception. In King's Garden
Inc. v. Federal Communications Com., Judge Wright expressed
doubts about the constitutionality of the religious exception. 39
According to Judge Wright's analysis, doing away with the
requirement that activities must be of a religious nature to be
excluded leads one to a situation where religious and nonreligious entrepreneurs are in competition. In creating this
distinction, "Congress placed itself on a collision course with the
Establishment Clause. '40 Judge Wright also noted that section
702's exclusion may be impermissible on Fifth Amendment
grounds. For example, where religious organizations compete
with secular organizations the government is forced to
discriminate
in
applying the Civil
Rights law
on
41
discrimination.
Although these are only a few of the many federal cases,
they are demonstrative of federal jurisprudence recognizing
religious organizations' right to terminate employment based on
religious grounds. However, potential plaintiffs may be able to
overcome this exclusion by showing the religious organization's
claimed exclusion was pretextual because other employees who
had engaged in the same or similar behavior were not treated in
the same fashion. Furthermore, the federal courts realize the
inherent tension between discrimination statutes and freedom of
religion. On the one hand, it is clearly unconstitutional to
enforce discrimination statutes in cases involving ministerial
employees.42 Concurrently, religious organizations cannot be
afforded complete immunity to discriminate as to all employees
without such a policy being construed as a state endorsement of
religion. Thus, there is an acceptable range in which exceptions
to discrimination must occur to be constitutionally acceptable.
B. Montana
As much as the federal jurisprudence is rich in variety of
factual scenarios and clarifying interpretations, the Montana

39. 498 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 55.
41. Id. at 57.
42. For example, imagine a Baptist preacher pursuing an action against a Jewish
synagogue for failing to hire him as a ministerial employee because of his religion.
Clearly, religious organizations must be free to choose their ministerial employees.
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jurisprudence is sparse. One of the only Montana cases dealing
with employment and religious issues is the 1986 decision of
Miller v. Catholic Diocese.43 In Miller, the dispute was whether
or not the recently adopted common-law tort of breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing could be applied to a
religious institution without violating the free exercise clauses of
the U.S. and Montana Constitutions. 44 The Montana Supreme
Court held the defense of freedom of religion raises a
fundamental right of the highest order; for a claim to reach trial
there must be a countering claim of right of the highest order.
Mary Pat Miller (now Mrs. Mullner) taught fifth and sixth
grade for Little Flower School in Billings, which was
45
administered by the Catholic Diocese of Great Falls-Billings.
Parents, other teachers, and a school administrator all voiced
concerns about a lack of discipline in her classroom. 46 Father
Wagner addressed his concerns with Mullner and asked her to
make changes. 47 In response, she asked him to be specific to
48
which he responded that she should know, being a teacher.
She asked him to put it in writing, but once again, he said that
she should know. 49 She was terminated and given fifteen days
50
pay in accord with her contract.
Mullner filed suit alleging breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in employment. 5 1 The District Court
granted summary judgment to defendants who claimed
application of the tort would interfere with the free exercise of
52
religion.
Because of the manner in which the plaintiff had argued the
case, the Montana Supreme Court was forced to make their
decision assuming that discipline was indeed a problem in
Mullner's classroom. 53 The appellees alleged that discipline was

43. Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls, 224 Mont. 113, 728 P.2d 794 (1986).
44. Miller, 224 Mont. at 116, 728 P.2d at 796.
45. Id.
46. Miller, 224 Mont. at 115, 728 P.2d at 794.
47. Appellant's Reply Brief, app. B, Miller v. Catholic Diocese, (Excerpts from
Deposition of Mary Pat Miller/Mullner, p 95 lines 24-25 through p. 96 line 9).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Miller, 224 Mont. 115, 728 P.2d 795.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Plaintiff as much as admitted discipline was a problem.
See Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellant at 17, "The validity of improper discipline being used as a reason to
terminate is not being questioned. What is being questioned is whether Plaintiff had
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such an integral part of the doctrine and methodology of the
Catholic teaching that a court could not hear evidence about
disciplinary measures without stepping over the line in regard
54
to hearing cases on the validity of religious tenets.
The Court concluded: "[T]hat discipline in the classroom is
so intertwined with teaching which in turn is intertwined with
religious principles that a court cannot properly make the
determination requested here without interfering with a
legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion." 55 In so
deciding, the Court applied the Yoder standard, "only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
56
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."
Because a tort claim was not of the highest order it was barred
by the free exercise clause. 57 Miller stands for the proposition
that when a defense of freedom of religion is raised, only a claim
of right of the highest order can survive a motion for summary
judgment.
III. THE DEFINITION OF MARITAL STATUS

Of central importance to this case is the definition of the
term marital status. MCA § 49-2-303 disallows discrimination
based on marital status when the reasonable dictates of the job
58
do not require such a distinction.
Discrimination premised on marital status was not always
recognized by inclusion within the statute. The statute was
originally enacted in 197459 as part of a long process, which was
in response to the federal enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. 60 Indeed, the legislature seems to have been motivated by
testimony that the Federal government would allow the various
states to retain responsibility where they would accept it. In
1970, William H. Brown, Chairman of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) said, "Congress provided that
where state and local agencies will do a job and not shirk their
notice of her shortcomings so she could correct them and whether her discipline met the
disciplinary standards set out by Little Flower School."
54. See Brief of Respondents at 12.
55. Miller, 224 Mont. at 118, 728 P.2d at 794.
56. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972), quoted in Miller, 224 Mont. at
118, 728 P.2d at 797.
57. Miller, 224 Mont. at 118, 728 P.2d at 797.
58. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1)(a) (2001).
59. En. 64-306 by Sec. 2, Ch. 283, (Mont. Leg. 1974).
60. See S.B. 697, attachment 1 (Mont. Leg. 1974).
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responsibility, we in the Federal Government should let them."61
William H. Brown wrote in a 1972 letter to Gov. Forrest H.
Anderson:
Title VII requires that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission give the states the first opportunity to identify and
eliminate employment discrimination in the public and private
sectors. Specifically, if there is a state anti-discrimination agency
administering appropriate enforceable legislation we may not
commence an investigation of a charge filed with us until 60 days
after we have deferred the charge to the state agency.62

This motivating influence on the legislature is important in that
it might later lead to a rule of interpretation. If the state
statute was enacted to maintain state jurisdiction over
discrimination matters, then the state statute might prohibit
more discrimination, but not less. This is akin to the notion that
a state's constitution may give more rights than the U.S.
Constitution, but it may not give fewer rights.
On enactment, the new statute did not contain the marital
status prohibition on discrimination. 63 The term marital status
was added during the 1975 legislature. 64 How they thought the
term would be interpreted, and what they meant by it is less
than clear. The legislative history indicates the legislators were
61. S.B. 697, (Mont. Leg. 1974), written testimony of Tony Softich, Administrator
of Labor Standards Division, quoting from William H. Brown, Chairman of EEOC, "The
Crime of Discrimination: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, Under
Title VII" (1970).
62. Letter from William H. Brown, III, Chairman of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, to Forrest H. Anderson, Montana Governor, (Dec. 22, 1972)
(written testimony attached to S.B. 697).
63. 1974 Mont. Laws sec. 2, Ch. 283, (Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 64-306 (1947)) reads
in part: Discriminatory practices described and prohibited. (1) It is an unlawful
discriminatory practice for: (a) an employer to refuse employment to a person, or to bar
him from employment, or to discriminate against him in compensation or in a term,
condition, or privilege of employment because of his race, religion, color, or national
origin or because of his age, physical or mental handicap or sex when the reasonable
demands of the position do not require an age, physical or mental handicap or sex
distinction;
64. This is a bit of deductive reasoning. The bills are missing from the Legislative
Histories of both S.B. 7, Ch. 121, 1975 Leg., and H.B. 633, 1975 Leg. However, the term
,marital status' was not present in the original enactment (see above), but the term was
present when other changes were discussed in the 1977 legislature (see 1977 Mont.
Laws, HB 36, Ch. 38, "64-3-6. Specific Disei
craiate y discriminatory practices dese4bed
and proh-ib-ed. (1) It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for: (a) an employer to
refuse employment to a person, or to bar him from employment, or to discriminate
against him in compensation or in a term, condition, or privilege of employment because
of his race, creed, religion, marital status, color or national origin or because of his age,
physical or mental handicap-.or sex when the reasonable demands of the position do not
require an age, physical or mental handicap, or sex distinction;). Thus, the term must
have been added in 1975.
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more focused on a debate on the appropriateness of not making
the Commission directly responsible to the Department of
Labor.65
There is only a limited record of legislators discussing
marital status. While the record indicates a wholesale
endorsement of including the term marital status, the record is
equally lacking in a discussion of the definition of the term.
Barbara Benetts Lynch submitted written comments, "I am
particularly interested in seeing "MARITAL STATUS" added to
the list of other discriminations in the Human Rights Act. I am
one of the sponsors of the original act & we were remiss in not
Margaret S. Davis,
including it in the first place." 66
representing the League of Women Voters, supported inclusion
of marital status. 67 The Montana Poverty Council submitted a
prepared type-written statement in favor of forbidding
discrimination based on marital status, but focused most of its
attention on removing language referring to the State
Department of Labor in order to retain autonomy for the Human
Rights Commission. 68 Thus, the enacting legislation and the
record are insufficient to extrapolate any original legislative
intent in regard to the definition of 'marital status.'
However, the legislature did consider a definition for
marital status in direct response to Thompson v. Board of
Trustees, School District No. 12.69 In Thompson, the Montana
Supreme Court interpreted the definition and the legislative
intent of the term 'marital status.' The school board had
adopted a policy which forbade school administrators of the
Harlem Public Schools from having a spouse employed in any
capacity in the Harlem school system. 70 In line with this new
policy, a superintendent was terminated, and a school principal
was lowered in rank to teacher because both of them were

65. 1975 Mont. Laws, see Minutes of the Meeting Labor & Employment Relations,
House of Representatives, Feb. 21, 1975.
66. See Written Comments submitted by Barbara Bennetts Lynch, to the House
Committee on Labor & Employment Relations, Feb. 21, 1975.
67. Written Comments submitted by Margaret Davis, to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, March 19, 1975.
68. Written Testimony submitted by Virginia Jellison, for the Montana Poverty
Advisory Council, Department of Intergovernmental Relations, to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, March 19, 1975.
69. Thompson v. Bd. of Trs., Sch. Dist. No. 12, 627 P.2d 1229, 192 Mont. 266
(1981).
70. Thompson, 192 Mont. at 268, 627 P.2d at 1230.
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married to teachers employed in the Harlem school system. 71
The teachers sought injunctive relief, but the District Court
found that 'marital status' was the "state of being married,
unmarried, divorced, or widowed." 72 The District Court granted
summary judgment to the defendant school district, as under
that definition, the school district did not require an employee to
73
possess any particular marital status.
The 1981 Montana Supreme Court construed the term
broadly in accord with Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-103, stating that
provisions of statutes are to be interpreted broadly, "with a view
to effect their objects and promote justice." 74 The statutes are
"strongly worded directives from the legislature prohibiting
employment discrimination and encouraging public employers to
hire, promote and dismiss employees solely on merit."75 The
court noted that an endorsement of the lower court's decision
would encourage plaintiff-appellants to divorce in order to keep
their jobs. 76 Following this logic, the Court stated 'marital
status' means the identity and occupation of one's spouse as well
as whether one is married, single, widowed or divorced. 77
Although the respondent and various amici curiae had
argued for "reasonable grounds" or "business necessity"
exceptions, the Court found there was no "reasonable grounds"
exception to discriminatory practices.7 8
Of note, Justice
Morrison dissented because the opinion precludes work rules
prohibiting one spouse from having a supervisory capacity over
79
the other.
The 1983 Legislature took action in response to this

71. Id.
72.
Thompson, 192 Mont. at 269, 627 P.2d at 1230.
73.
Thompson, 192 Mont. at 268, 627 P.2d at 1230.
74. Thompson, 192 Mont. at 270, 627 P.2d at 1231; citing to MONT. CODE ANN. § 12-103 (2001).
75. Thompson, 192 Mont. at 270, 627 P.2d at 1231.
76. The elliptical logic here is that state policy discouraging nepotism is not
intended to encourage divorce.
77. Thompson, 192 Mont. at 270, 271, 627 P.2d at 1231. Note that the court's
actual language on 270 is, "We therefore hold that a liberal definition of the term
"marital status" as used in those statutes, includes the identity and occupation of one's
spouse." The Court then goes on, "[bly determining that "marital status" includes the
identity and occupation of one spouse as well as whether one is married, single, widowed
or divorced, we conclude that plaintiff is entitled to judgment on his complaint as a
matter of law." One might argue the former definition is the holding and the latter is
dicta.
78. Id.
79. Thompson, 192 Mont. at 272, 627 P.2d at 1232.
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decision. Legislators sought to enact legislation which would
implement both the decision and account for the dissent,
allowing reasonable rules when a married couple works for the
same employer. The legislature amended the existing statute,
adding marital status to the phrase listing exclusions, "when the
reasonable demands of the position do not require a... marital
0
status . . . distinction."
The Human Rights Commission sponsored the bill.8 ' The
Commission offered written testimony:
In view of the broad construction of the term marital status
adopted by the Court, the Commission believes that some limited
exceptions to the prohibitions of marital status discrimination in
employment should exist, for example, in situations where an
of
employee audits the work of another employee or in the case 82
governmental employment, where nepotism is prohibited by law.

In support of the bill, the chief counsel for the University System
opined that the bill reinstates the nepotism law which was
wiped out by the court decision.8 3 There was also testimony
from the Montana School Boards Association representative,
who felt this was a problem "they run into quite often in school
districts,"8 4 and this, "would given (sic) them a uniform policy
that they can deal with."8 5 The ensuing discussion of the
committee related to anti-nepotism laws.
In the Senate committee, Representative C. Farris stated
that the bill, "implements a Montana Supreme Court ruling
holding that marital status discrimination is unlawful
discrimination. What it will do is it would allow employers to
say he doesn't want two members of the same family."8 6 Thus,
the 1983 Legislature intended both to adopt the definition
80. 1983 Mont. Laws Ch. 279.
81. "Rep. Farris... stated that this bill was introduced at the request of the
Human Rights Commission," House Judiciary Committee minutes, page 11, Feb. 11,
1983.
82. Minutes of the Feb. 11, 1983 Meeting on H.B. 501 Before the House Comm. On
Judiciary, 1983 Leg., 48th Sess. Ex. J. (Mont. 1983) (position statement of Human Rights
Commission, read by Raymond Brown, Administrator, Human Rights Division of the
Department of Labor and Industry).
83. Minutes of the Feb. 11, 1983 Meeting on H.B. 501 Before the House Comm. on
Judiciary, 1983 Leg., 48th Sess. 12 (Mont. 1983) (statement of Leroy Schramm, Chief
Legal Counsel, University System).
84. Id. (statement of Chip Erdman, representing the Montana School Boards
Association).
85. Id.
86. Minutes of the March 15, 1983 Meeting on H.B. 501 Before the Senate Comm.
on Judiciary, 1983 Leg., 48th Sess. (Mont. 1983) (statement of Rep. Carol Farris, sponsor,
H.B.501).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/12

14

2003

V. ST. LABRE
BIGBACK
PARKER
LeClaire:
Parker-Bigback
v. St. LabreSCHOOL
School

347

provided for in Thompson, but to also allow the statute to
operate without interfering with anti-nepotism laws.
Subsequent legislatures also addressed the marital status
provision. The 1985 Legislature addressed the issue of marital
status, attempting to clarify the relation between the antidiscrimination scheme and the anti-nepotism scheme.87 The
1993 Legislature addressed the issue of marital status
88
discrimination in regard to employee benefit plans.
This survey of the legislative history of the statute
demonstrates several things about the legislature's intent in
First, the
regard to the application of marital status.
the
Montana
incorporate
and
to
adopt
Legislature intended
Supreme Court's decision in Thompson, the clear terms of which
draw a line protecting the private conduct of individuals,
including the identity and occupation of spouses and whether
those individuals were married, single, widowed or divorced.
The only chink in this armor protecting individuals from
employment decisions based on anything other than merit is
where the reasonable demands of the position require the
distinction, which the Legislature considered only in regard to
nepotism situations in public employment, or when a private
employer has a situation with one spouse in a supervisory
capacity over another. The Legislature never intended to allow
institutions to terminate their employees based on the
institution's moral approval of the employee's private conduct in
regard to marital status.
IV. THE PARKER-BIGBACK DECISION

Parker-Bigback claimed that it was inappropriate for the
lower court to grant summary judgment solely on the grounds
that it could not consider the claim without interfering with St.
Labre's free exercise of religion.89 First, facts were in dispute,
87. See Minutes of the March 14, 1985 Meeting on S.B. 230 Before the House
th
Comm. on Judiciary,1985 Leg., 49 Sess. 5-7 (Mont. 1985); Minutes of the Feb. 11, 1985
Meeting on S.B. 230 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1985 Leg., 49t" Sess. 1-2
(Mont. 1985). Senate Bill 230 amended § 49-2-303 to add, "(3) Compliance with 2-2-302
and 2-2-303, which prohibit nepotism in public agencies, may not be construed as a
violation of this section." 1985 Mont. Laws 342.
88. See 1993 Mont. Laws Ch. 13 (sec. 3 amended § 49-2-303 to make it gender
neutral and added, "(5) It is not discrimination on the basis of marital status for an
employer to make all or part of the premium contributions toward group insurance for
employees and their dependants.").
89. Appellant's. Brief and Apps. at 7, Parker-Bigback v. St. Labre School (2000)
(No. 98-731).
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and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. Second, the
freedom of religion claim based on Montana's Constitution
competes with other rights found therein, such as the right to
privacy, and the right to personal dignity, which forbids
discrimination. 90
Defendants responded with a more coherent and readable
argument. First, that freedom of religion disallows the court
from intruding into the matter. 9 1 St. Labre cited Miller as
applicable precedent for the proposition that to even inquire into
the validity of the claim would impermissibly involve the court
in ecclesiastical matters. 92 Next, the free exercise of religion
clause overrides Parker-Bigback's rights. 93
St. Labre also
argued in the alternative that Parker-Bigback could not prevail
on a discrimination claim anyway because she had not met her
94
burden of proof.
The ACLU, as amicus curiae, argued first that, "Although
federal courts will not inquire into the employment relations
between church and ministerial employees, they will intervene
to curb certain discrimination
against non-ministerial
employees." 95 Further, the Montana Constitution specifically
protects against discrimination "on the basis of religion" 96 by the
97
government or any person, firm, corporation, or institution.
The precedent of Miller is not a blanket immunity. Rather, that
plaintiffs cause was disallowed because the tort of breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not a right of the
highest order and did not otherwise serve so as to overbalance
90. Id. at 13.
91. Respondent's Brief at 9, Parker-Bigback (No. 98-731).
92. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 19.
94. See id. at 24-30.
95. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU of Montana at 2, Parker-Bigback (No. 98-731).
96. Id. at 5. Note that this may not be entirely accurate. Mont. Const. Art. II § 4
provides, "Individual Dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any
person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the
exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin
or condition, or political or religious ideas." Bigback did not claim that she was
discriminated against because her religious ideas differed from the School and the
Catholic Church, but rather that she was terminated because she had a relationship out
of wed-lock and thus was discriminated against because of her marital status.
97. Thus, one might reasonably argue the Montana Constitution prevents an
institution such as the Catholic Church from discriminating on religious grounds.
Although an institution's freedom of religion and freedom of association rights would
preclude claims of ministerial employees, it still begs the question as to non-ministerial
employees.
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the defendant's claim to the free exercise of religion. Because
the right to privacy and the right to be free from discrimination
are found in the same Article of the Montana Constitution as the
freedom of religion, they are also rights of the highest order
which the court must balance equally.
The Roman Catholic Bishops also submitted amicus briefs.
They argued that St. Labre expected and contracted for its
employees to be Christian role models for students. 98 They
admitted that St. Labre terminated Parker-Bigback "based on
the application of the doctrines and principles of the Catholic
Church." 99 The Bishops then argued that affirming the summary
judgment would afford the school the religious freedom
guaranteed in the Constitution. 10 0
The decision was written by Justice Terry N. Treweiler, to
which Justices Turnage, Hunt, and Regnier concurred. Chief
Justice Karla Gray specially concurred, and Justice Leaphart
dissented with Justice Nelson joining him.
The majority opinion noted that during Parker-Bigback's
employment at St. Labre there were times when she was
married and times when she was single. "She did not claim to
have been terminated because she was single." 10 1 According to
her deposition, she was terminated because Father Hoffman
disapproved of her lifestyle of "living with someone."1 0 2 The
court then concluded that Parker-Bigback was not terminated
because of her marital status, but rather her conduct.10 3 The
court analogized that if she was married, and engaged in the
same conduct - living with someone to whom she was not
married, the result would have been the same. 10 4 Surprisingly,
the court specifically noted of a lack of offered authority on the
issue of Montana's Constitutional right to freedom from
discrimination and whether that right is fundamental. 10 5 The

98. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Roman Catholic Bishops of the Dioceses of Helena and
Great Falls-Billings, at 4, Parker-Bigback(No. 98-731).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Parker-Bigback, 11.
102. Id.
12.
103. Id.
14.
104. Id.
15.
105. Id.
16. This is true because the Court either has not yet had the opportunity
to consider these rights or because when afforded the opportunity, the court refuses to
consider these rights. Normally, a court would refer to this as an issue of first
impression. The Court appears to be setting up a "Catch-22." Citing the Montana
Constitution and drawing analogous links to other decisions regarding rights in the
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Court then found Bigback had contractually agreed to avoid the
conduct when she was hired, and therefore her right to be free
10 6
from discrimination was not violated.
On the original motion for
Justice Gray concurred.
summary judgment, St. Labre had argued not only that to hear
the case would impermissibly interfere with freedom of religion,
but also argued in the alternative that Bigback had failed to
10 7
make a prima facie case of discrimination in her complaint.
In Montana, there are two tests for the appropriateness of
summary judgment motions in discrimination cases. 0 8 Justice
Gray reasoned the Heiat test must be used here, because the
parties dispute the reason for the termination and the alleged
discrimination can be established only through circumstantial
evidence. 0 9 According to Heiat, a plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination. 110 This includes
alleging membership of a protected class, satisfactory job
performance, and the employer's specific conduct was
discrimination."' After which, an employer has the opportunity
to establish a nondiscriminatory reason, to which the plaintiff
must produce evidence establishing the prima facie case, and
the plaintiff must also produce evidence establishing the
employer's alleged nondiscriminatory reason is merely
112
pretextual.
On this issue, Justice Gray concluded that looking to the
four paragraph complaint, Bigback failed to allege a prima facie
case of discrimination." 3 Justice Gray also dealt with Bigback's
alternate argument, that she was terminated in retaliation for
her testifying at a co-worker's human rights complaint against
St. Labre. Here, Bigback established the initial prima facie
with a
Hoffman responded
case,
to which Father
nondiscriminatory reason, shifting the burden of proof back to

same section is insufficient (to prove it is fundamental). One must cite a case regarding
that specific section (as providing a fundamental right). Yet, until the court hears a case
citing that section, no one can argue that section (as providing a fundamental right).
106. Id.
17.
107. Parker-Bigback, 21 (Gray, J., concurring).
108. See Heiat v. E. Montana Coll., 275 Mont. 322, 328, 912 P.2d 787, 792 (1996);
and Reeves v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 1998 MT 13, 15, 278 Mont. 196, 953 P.2d 703.
109. Parker-Bigback v. St. Labre, 22 (Gray, J., concurring).
110. Heiat, 275 Mont. at 331, 912 P.2d at 793.
111. Parker-Bigback, 23 (Gray, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id. 25.
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114
plaintiff to produce evidence establishing the primafacie case.
Justice Gray concluded Bigback failed to meet this third Heiat
115
prong.
Justice Leaphart dissented because Justice Treweiler's
conclusion was disputable and raised a question of fact whether Parker-Bigback had indeed agreed not to engage in
conduct counter to the teachings of the Catholic Church. 116 The
record did indicate contract language requiring such
comportment. 1 7
But, St. Labre's employee manual also
contained a statement of policy on affirmative action, which
might reasonably be interpreted as a statement that St. Labre
8
would not discriminate on the basis of marital status."
Also, Leaphart disagreed with the differentiation between
conduct and status.

Her conduct was living with someone of the opposite sex. In order
to determine whether that conduct offends the teachings of the
Catholic Church, one must look to her marital status. If, as here,
her marital status is single, then the conduct is offensive to the

Church. 119

Justice Leaphart concluded that in light of Father
Hoffman's expressed disapproval of Bigback's conduct of living
with a man to whom she was not married, this constituted
discrimination on the basis of marital status. 20 Further, Justice
Leaphart reasoned that due to the contractual analysis
necessary to determine whether or not Bigback had agreed or
had not agreed to engage in certain conduct, the Court could
have avoided the constitutional claim and resolved the issue on
contract doctrine.
The decision of Parker-Bigback sets bad precedent for
several reasons. Montanans are left with an anti-discriminatory
scheme whose outer limits of reasonable exception requirements
114. Id. 27.
115. Id.
116. Id. 37 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
117. Parker-Bigback, 37, 2000 MT 210, 301 Mont. 16, 7 P.3d. 361.
118. Id.
34, 37. The policy statement reads as follows:
"Affirmative Action. St. Labre complies with Federal and State law regarding
discrimination in employment. Applicants for employment shall be considered
for employment, and employees shall hold employment, without discrimination
because of age, sex, physical or mental handicap or marital status as required
by the Montana Human Rights Act and the Federal Law."
(How this policy is to be interpreted is questionable in light of the federal decisions
operating in the vacuum of state decisions).
119. Id. 39.
120. Id.
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are unknown. First'and foremost, the decision redefines a
statutorily protected class without actually stating a definition.
Further, before Parker-Bigback, one might have concluded that
the protections afforded Montana citizens under MCA § 49-2-103
operated in conjunction with the state constitutional protections
against discrimination and protecting individuals' rights to
privacy.
The majority was wrong to decide a case with fundamental
rights implications when the decision appealed from was a
summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only
where no material facts are contested and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 121 The district court
essentially decided that the plaintiff could not prevail under any
set of facts without trammeling on St. Labre's free exercise of
religion. The Montana Supreme Court responded by
determining a set of facts which precluded the constitutional
issue. Yet, as indicated by Justice Leaphart's dissent, it was not
clear whether she was contractually required to abide by the
teachings of the church.
The Montana Supreme Court freely admits to avoiding
constitutional questions whenever possible, addressing issues of
statutory interpretation instead. This is an accepted rule of
construction, which was not mentioned in the decision. Yet this
is exactly what the court did, not only interpreting the statute so
as to avoid the constitutional question but also conducting a de
novo review of the facts. Such a result is surprising considering
the decision appealed from was based on constitutional issues
resulting in a finding of law. The parties and amicus curiae all
addressed the constitutional issues of competing rights,
anticipating a constitutional analysis.
The federal jurisprudence regarding discrimination cases
involving religious institutions clearly reflects a tension between
freedom of religion and discrimination. Because the former is a
constitutional right and the latter is only statutory, the former
clearly trumps the latter. But even here there is an outer limit.
Courts are also wary of crossing the line into state endorsement
of religion by affording more rights to religious institutions such
as immunity from liability from discrimination. Even though
the Montana Supreme Court did not decide the issue on freedom
of religion grounds, the decision in favor of the religious
organization will likely be interpreted by Montana practitioners
121.

MONT. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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as a shield of immunity from discrimination statutes for
religious organizations.
In Montana, individuals are afforded more rights than
under the federal constitution. The jurisprudential analysis
should reflect this difference. This court has previously been
willing to address difficult issues such as the constitutionality of
an anti-abortion statute 122 and whether a sodomy law was
unconstitutional as conflicting with the privacy clause. 123
Further, the Montana Supreme Court has found that certain
contract terms which run counter to public policy are
unenforceable. 1 24 Montanans have a fundamental right to
privacy on which they may reasonably rely as they conduct
themselves within the privacy of their own homes.125
Synthesizing such precedents as Casarotto and Gryzcan would
seem to require a higher standard before one might
contractually waive such a fundamental right. Although not yet
applied to this clause, 126 other fundamental rights may only be
waived knowingly and intelligently. 127 Here, where there were
conflicting contractual documents 128 it is hard to imagine a court
could easily conclude Parker-Bigback simply agreed to abide by
certain conduct. Indeed, to do otherwise indicates a higher
value placed on knowingly agreeing to arbitration outside of the
state than is placed on unknowingly granting one's employer the
power to determine who shares one's bed. That seems an odd
result in a state with explicit Constitutional privacy terms and
terms precluding discrimination by institutions.
Furthermore, it is troublesome that the Montana Supreme
Court sub silentio destroyed the status protected by antidiscrimination law. First, the legislative history makes it clear
that the legislators intended marital status would protect more
than just married couples. Marital status is inherently a legal
recognition of status conditioned by conduct. This case sets an
abhorrent precedent in that it allows crafty employers to
122. See Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364.
123. See Gryzcan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
124. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 274 Mont. 3, 901 P.2d 596 (1995).
125. See, e.g., Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, 312 Mont. 1, 58 P.3d 128
(plaintiffs may recover against government officials in a Bivens action when their actions
were violative of state constitution's guarantee of privacy).
126. Justice Treweiller notes a lack of offered authority on this constitutional
clause. See Parker-Bigback, 16.
127. See Moss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, $150, 310 Mont. 123, 54
P.3d 1 (Nelson, J., concurring).
128. See Parker-Bigback, 25-42 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
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discriminate based on 'conduct' rather than class status, even
though the 'conduct' is inherently linked to the otherwise
protected status.
For example, could a day care provider refuse to hire a
lesbian who lives with her lover and their children, premising
the refusal on the conduct of raising children outside of the
bonds of holy matrimony? Holy matrimony is a status which the
lesbian can never obtain. The daycare provider's defense would
be that she was screening employees based on conduct rather
than the protected classes of sex or marital status. The
aformentioned is clearly a ludicrous result, counter to the clear
intent of the legislation.
The Court might have also reached the same result by
exploring the exception clause in the statute. By the simple
terms of the statute, employers are free to make such
distinctions when the reasonable demands of the job so require.
This would logically include situations such as a religious
organization's ability to choose a ministerial employee, a nonprofit hiring a female rape counselor, or a university hiring a
minority employee to be in charge of minority student
recruitment.
Whether or not St. Labre truly contracted with ParkerBigback to refrain from engaging in certain behavior should not
be addressed by the Court. While it is true that individuals
generally have freedom to contract, the state constrains the
exercise of this freedom within the grounds of public policy. 129
The area of relations between employers and employees is one
needful of regulation due to the inherent inequalities of the
relationship. 130 Among other specific issues, this is expressed
through anti-discrimination laws. Common sense dictates that
employers must be able to curtail certain conduct of their
employees.
For example, could a university admissions
employee date potential students he met through the application
process? Such a situation creates a readily apparent conflict
which reasonable people would agree should be avoided.
Could such a rationale be applied to the situation of Parker129. See, e.g., Portable Embryonics, Inc. v. J.P. Genetics, Inc., 248 Mont. 242, 810
P.2d 1197 (1991), see also Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986).
130. The Montana Supreme Court has premised decisions on the inherent
inequalities in a relationship. See, e.g., Heltborg v. Modern Machinery, 244 Mont. 24,
795 P.2d 954 (1990); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687
P.2d 1015 (1984); But see Medicine Horse v. Trustees, Big Horn County School Dist. No.
27, 251 Mont. 65,823 P.2d 230 (1991).
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Bigback?
The discrimination scheme clearly precludes
employers from discriminating on marital status unless the
reasonable demands of the job so dictate.
Such a reasonable demands basis could be founded on
multiple findings. For example, it is conceivable in a lightly
populated state like Montana that students would likely know of
a teacher's social activities outside of work. The questions would
then include whether the students had knowledge of the
conduct, and whether that knowledge so affected the studentteacher relationship as to render it inoperable. In such a
situation, a court might reasonably conclude that the reasonable
demands of the job dictated such a behavioral curtailment. Only
in that narrow factual situation should the court have addressed
the question.
Ultimately, the Montana Supreme Court decided a case
raised on appeal from a trial court which summarily decided the
issues on a constitutional pretext. In addressing the question,
the Montana Supreme Court should not have shied away from
the issue of evaluating the competing fundamental
constitutional rights. The drafters of the Montana Constitution
gave all Montanans a right to be free from discrimination.
Unlike clauses of the federal constitution, this right is written in
a manner which proscribes discrimination not just from the
government, but also from private sources.
Justice Treweiller's opinion chides the plaintiff-appellant
and amicus curiae for raising a constitutional issue without the
authority of controlling precedent. In the thirty years since
enacting this Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court has not
had opportunity to decide this clause. If the court which is
supposed to interpret these clauses refuses to do so, where can
Montana practitioners find even arguably similar non131
controlling precedent?
Yet, as the saying goes, it takes two to tango. Perhaps the
Montana Supreme Court has not yet addressed this specific
clause because Montana practitioners have been loath to raise
the issue. Montanans are lucky to have a court which is not
normally afraid to apply the provisions of the Montana
Constitution. The Court may not have been able to duck the
131. Heinz Kug's comparative constitutional analysis may prove a fertile
groundwork. Yet, other authors previously commented on this clause. See, e.g.,
Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the
Montana Constitution's "Dignity" Clause With Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev.
301 (2000).
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issue had Parker-Bigback specifically raised not just marital
status, but also sex, as a basis for her claim. This would have
more specifically invoked Article Two Section Four, and the
Court would have been more likely to weigh the competing
concerns.
Montana practitioners must be appraised of the
Montana Constitution and be prepared to raise those issues
from the outset.
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